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Abstract When children reach 10 years old they are exposed to the full
brunt of the criminal law with no defence available to them to reflect their
status as children. Legal theorists have repeatedly argued that criminal
responsibility should only be imposed on individuals who have the ca-
pacity and freedom to choose how they behave. Children only have
limited personal autonomy and therefore lack this capacity and freedom
to make a genuine choice about their behaviour. They should therefore
benefit from a new defence which moves away from the doli incapax
emphasis on moral understanding and is available to children up to the
age of 14.
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When children reach 10 years old they are exposed to the full brunt of
the criminal law with no defence available to them to reflect their status
as children.1 This situation has frequently been criticised,2 but the law
has not been changed; in fact it has been made more severe for children
with the abolition of the doli incapax defence confirmed in R v JTB.3 One
reason why criticism of this area of law has not lead to reform may be
that there has been no methodical analysis to explain why it is wrong to
criminalise young children, instead there are general assertions of the
harm done to children in the criminal justice system or general refer-
ences to children’s human rights. This article seeks to fill this gap by
exploring the fundamental question of why criminal responsibility
should not be imposed on children aged over 10 years old. To do this,
we need to go back to the fundamental question considered by legal
theorists about when criminal responsibility should be imposed.4 In this
article it will be argued that criminal responsibility should only be
imposed on individuals who have the capacity and freedom to choose
* Senior Lecturer, City University, London; e-mail: C.Elliott@city.ac.uk. I would like
to thank Kabir Sondhi and Tom Collins for their assistance in carrying out the
research for this article.
1 Section 50 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 provides: ‘It shall be
conclusively presumed that no child under the age of ten years can be guilty of
any offence’.
2 See, e.g., the European Committee of Social Rights, Conclusions XVII-2 (United
Kingdom), reference period 1 January 2003 to 31 December 2004.
3 [2009] UKHL 20, [2009] 2 WLR 1088, interpreting s. 34 of the Crime and
Disorder Act 1998.
4 See, e.g., H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility: Essays in the Philosophy of Law
(Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1968).
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how they behave. Children only have limited personal autonomy and
therefore do not have the capacity and freedom to make this choice and
there is therefore a fundamental injustice when criminal liability is
imposed on children. While the concept of childhood may be a social
concept with no fixed boundaries, a 10-year-old is unquestionably in
UK society a child who is still experiencing childhood, but there is
currently no recognition of this in the criminal law. Childhood now
provides young people with very little protection from the full rigours of
the criminal law and the priority of retribution. While there were clearly
problems with the defence of doli incapax which have been well docu-
mented,5 its abolition represents a move towards ‘adultification’6 and
the gap left by the abolition of the old defence needs to be filled with a
new defence that more accurately reflects the reason why children
should be treated differently than adults. By exploring the concept of
criminal responsibility it will become clear that the historical defence of
doli incapax was fundamentally flawed because it was permitting the
defence for reasons which were not at the heart of why criminal
responsibility was inappropriate for many children. This gap between
the legal requirements for the defence and the reason for denying
criminal responsibility ultimately meant the defence became disengaged
from reality and lost the support of the judges and practitioners, to the
point where it became almost routine to conclude the presumption of
doli incapax had been rebutted, with very little evidence to support this
rebuttle being required. The way forward is to establish a new defence of
being a minor which has its foundations built on the child’s lack of
capacity and freedom to choose because of his or her limited personal
autonomy, which is the reason for the denial of criminal responsibility
and the intervention of the civil system instead.  
Young people and the courts
In recent years, the criminal justice net for young people has widened
with such legal developments as the abolition of the defence of doli
incapax and the creation of anti-social behaviour orders, which are civil
orders, but which, if breached, give rise to criminal liability. The aboli-
tion of the defence of doli incapax was confirmed by the House of Lords
in R v JTB.7 This case was criticised by Francis Bennion who argued that
the decision:
should be treated as incorrect so far as it fails to recognize that in the case
of complex offences, for example forgery and certain consensual sexual
behaviour such as that engaged in by Boy A, the prosecution may still need
to establish by evidence that a defendant who is below the age of discretion
5 Laws J in the Divisional Court in C (A Minor) v DPP [1994] 3 WLR 888 declared
the presumption defunct, and though his decision was reversed on appeal ([1996]
AC 1), the House of Lords accepted that the rebuttable presumption could give
rise to anomalies.
6 L. Steinberg and R. G. Schwartz, ‘Developmental Psychology Goes to Court’ in
T. Grisso and R. G. Schwartz (eds), Youth on Trial: A Developmental Perspective on
Juvenile Justice (University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2000) 13.
7 [2009] UKHL 20, [2009] 2 WLR 1088.
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possesses the requisite mens rea. In JTB this meant that the prosecution
needed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Boy A understood the
substance of the ingredients of the offence in question, for example those
imported by the [Sexual Offences Act 2003] definition of ‘sexual’.8
Bennion’s arguments could amount to bringing back the issues raised in
the doli incapax defence through the concept of mens rea but only for
‘complex offences’. The main difference to the former defence would be
the burden of proof. But even if Bennion’s argument is accepted, there
will be problems identifying which offences should be treated as ‘com-
plex’ for these purposes, and this analysis of the law still provides
inadequate protection to children.
There is clearly unease among some judges and academics with the
current application of the criminal law to young children. It is particu-
larly in the context of sexual offences that the problems with the current
law have been highlighted. It is possible that a 10-year-old child might
well regard his sexual experimentation as ‘naughty’ without realising
that it could give rise to criminal liability. The dangers of criminalising
children were observed in the context of sexual experimentation by
Lord Hope in his dissenting judgment in R v G:
A heavy responsibility has been placed on prosecuting authorities, where
both parties are of a similar young age, to discriminate between cases
where the proscribed activity was truly mutual on the one hand and those
where the complainant was subjected to an element of exploitation or
undue pressure on the other. In the former case more harm than good may
be done by prosecuting.9
The lack of control over the exercise of this discretion to prosecute adds
to the risk of injustice.10
In S and Marper v United Kingdom11 the European Court of Human
Rights referred to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989
and commented upon the importance of treating young people differ-
ently than adults with regard to the criminal justice system ‘given their
special situation and the importance of their development and in-
tegration in society’.12
Internationally, the law in England is out of step because of its early
criminalisation of minors. Worldwide, the current median age at which
criminal responsibility will be imposed is 12 years.13 The United Nations’
Committee on the Rights of the Child, has condemned the UK for
imposing criminal liability on very young children. The European Com-
mittee of Social Rights, the body responsible for the monitoring of
8 F. Bennion, ‘Mens Rea and Defendants below the Age of Discretion’ [2009] Crim
LR 757 at 769.
9 [2003] UKHL 50, [2003] 4 All ER 765 at [14].
10 Compare R v G [2008] UKHL 37, [2009] 1 AC 92 where the young offender was
prosecuted under s. 5 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 and the case of R (on the
application of S) v DPP [2006] EWHC 2231 (Admin) where, on similar facts, the
case was prosecuted under the less serious offence of s. 13 of the Sexual Offences
Act 2003. 
11 App. Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04 (2009) 48 EHRR 50.
12 Ibid. at [124].
13 D. Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility:A Global
Perspective (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2009) ch. 7.
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compliance with the European Social Charter, has also found that
minimum ages of criminal responsibility of under 12 are incompatible
with Article 17 of the Charter.14
The Legal Theory of Criminal Responsibility
The existing defence available to children under 10 years of being a
minor relies completely on the simple status of being a child as a
justification for the defence. But the status of being a child experiencing
childhood does not neatly stop at 10. The perception of a child depends
on a society’s culture and values which evolve over time.15 Don Cipriani
has commented:
the notion and meaning of childhood is not itself a natural phenomenon or
scientific fact, even though it is certainly related to the natural, biological
realities of children.16
While our existing defence for children is a status defence, the delimita-
tion of its boundaries at the age of 10 seem impossible to justify as the
young offender still falls firmly within the status of a child at the age of
11 and beyond. So a simple explanation of the defence on the basis of
status is unsatisfactory and instead a deeper exploration of why the
defence is available needs to be undertaken in order to determine where
a logical boundary for its application should fall.
While nothing will be gained by comparing the different legal ap-
proaches taken around the world to children, all the countries are
grappling with the same fundamental question—‘At what age should
criminal responsibility be imposed on children?’—and this in itself rests
on fundamental issues of when criminal responsibility is justified. The
UK government’s Consultation Paper, Tackling Youth Crime17 that pre-
ceded the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 justified the abolition of the
defence of doli incapax on the basis that this would send a clear signal
that in general children of 10 and over ‘should be held accountable for
their own actions'.18 Accountability and responsibility in this context are
effectively synonyms, but the government makes no effort to consider
the fundamental question of whether children can justifiably be found
criminally responsible for their acts. Nicola Lacey has explained that
criminal responsibility is a:
practice of attribution which is specific to criminal law yet which is con-
nected with prevailing intellectual ideas, including—though, obviously,
not restricted to—philosophical theories about the nature of human be-
ings. The content and emphasis of these problems can be expected to
change according to the environment in which the system operates, with
14 European Committee of Social Rights, above n. 2: ‘a minimum age of criminal
responsibility below the age of 12 years is considered by the Committee not to be
internationally acceptable’.
15 J. Fionda, Devils and Angels: Youth Policy and Crime (Hart: Oxford, 2005) ch. 1.
16 Cipriani, above n. 13 at 2.
17 Home Office, Tackling Youth Crime: Reforming Youth Justice (Home Office: London,
1997).
18 Ibid. at [15].
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important factors including the distinction of political interests and eco-
nomic powers; the prevailing cultural and intellectual environment; the
organization and relative status of relevant professional groups and the
array and vigour of alternative means of social ordering.19
Thus criminal responsibility is not a static concept, but adapts to the
social environment in which it is applied. The concept should not just
adapt to ‘the relative status of relevant professional groups’20 it must also
show a sensitivity to the vulnerabilities of certain groups in society. In
the context of children, the criminal law needs to be able to adapt its
focus to a child-centric view of the world where children are ‘under-
stood in relation to their own social world and therefore assign children
a more primary position and active role . . . which may enable the adult
community to understand more and condemn less’.21
At the heart of the criminal justice system is the power to punish;
criminal responsibility should be imposed on people who deserve to be
punished, if punishment is not required then the civil system is more
appropriate. To impose a punishment the criminal law should be looking
for personal responsibility which requires capacity and choice22 which in
themselves are a reflection of personal autonomy. Young children lack
capacity and they are not autonomous individuals. That lack of auton-
omy is visually obvious with regard to a baby who cannot even clothe
and feed itself, but continues to exist well beyond this period. The great
legal philosopher Professor Hart explained:
What is crucial is that those whom we punish should have had, when they
acted, the normal capacities, physical and mental, for doing what the law
requires and abstaining from what it forbids, and a fair opportunity to
exercise these capacities.  Where these capacities and opportunities are
absent. . . . the moral protest is that it’s morally wrong to punish because
‘he could not have helped it’, or ‘he could not have done otherwise’ or ‘he
had no real choice’.23
Capacity and children
Regarding the issue of capacity as a requirement for justifying the
imposition of criminal responsibility, Cane has observed that:
It is generally agreed that a minimum level of mental and physical capacity
is a precondition of culpability. A person should not be blamed if they
lacked basic understanding of the nature and significance of their conduct
or basic control over it, unless their lack of capacity was itself the result of
culpable conduct on their part.24
19 N. Lacey, ‘In Search of the Responsible Subject: History, Philosophy and Social
Sciences in Criminal law Theory’ (2001) 64 MLR 350 at 351.
20 Ibid.
21 Fionda, above n. 15 at 32.
22 Hart, above n. 4 at 152.
23 Ibid.
24 P. Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart Publishing: Oxford, 2002) 65.
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Duff and von Hirsch have argued that criminal responsibility is founded
upon ‘the notion of rational agency’.25 In other words, criminal liability
can only be imposed if a person is capable of recognising that his or her
conduct was not motivated by good reasons. John Gardner has argued
persuasively that criminal liability should only be imposed on those who
have the ‘ability to live within reason’.26 Hart argues that there is a
minimum mental and physical capacity a person must possess if they
are to be subjected to criminal liability, which he called ‘capacity
responsibility’.27
Science can provide the proof that children lack capacity and cannot
therefore be treated as ‘rational agents’, ‘motivated by reason’ for the
purposes of the imposition of criminal responsibility. The College of
Psychiatrists observed:
Biological factors such as the functioning of the frontal lobes of the brain
play an important role in the development of self-control and of other
abilities. The frontal lobes are involved in an individual’s ability to manage
the large amount of information entering consciousness from many
sources, in changing behaviour, in using acquired information, in planning
actions and in controlling impulsivity. Generally the frontal lobes are felt to
mature at approximately 14 years of age.28
The under-developed intellectual competence of children is referred to
directly by  the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Admin-
istration of Juvenile Justice (known as the Beijing Rules) regarding the
setting of the minimum age of criminal responsibility. Rule 4.1 states
that the minimum age ‘. . . shall not be fixed at too low an age level,
bearing in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual matur-
ity’.29 Fortin has studied the scientific research on child development
and concluded that:
the intellectual competence of young children aged up to about 11 or 12 is
far less sophisticated than that of adolescents between the ages of 12 and
18. Researchers . . . have also noted significant changes in the cognitive and
social development within both groups as they grow older. . . . It is only
during the onset of early adolescence that young people become competent
to think in abstract terms. With this comes the capacity to feel guilt and
shame, linked with an awareness of the implications for others of the
offender's wrongful actions.30
25 A. Duff and A. von Hirsch, ‘Responsibility, Retribution and the “Voluntary”: A
Response to Williams’ [1997] CLJ 103. See on this subject H. Keating, ‘The
‘Responsibility’ of Children in the Criminal Law’ [2007] CFLQ 183.
26 J. Gardner, Offences and Defences: Selected Essays in the Philosophy of Criminal Law
(Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2008) 112.
27 Hart, above n. 4 at 227.
28 Royal College of Psychiatrists, Child Defendants: Occasional Paper, OP56 (2006) 38.
29 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice A/RES/40/33, 29 November 1985, available
at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/40/a40r033.htm, accessed 7 June 2011.
30 J. Fortin, Children’s Rights and the Developing Law (Cambridge University Press:
Cambridge, 1998) 72–3, cited by H. Keating ‘Reckless Children?’ [2007] Crim LR
546 at footnote 61. See also M. Rutter and M. Rutter, Developing Minds: Challenge
and Continuity across the Life Span (Penguin Books: London, 1993) and J. Coleman
and L. Hendry, The Nature of Adolescence (Routledge: London, 1999).
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Emotional maturity in legal decision-making contexts is generally lower
among children aged between 11 and 13 years compared to older
children; they are less able to understand the long-term consequences of
their behaviour, perceive risks, resist peer influences, and comply with
authority figures.31 Alarm bells ring when one learns that the children
convicted as criminally responsible for the murder of Jamie Bulger had
access to a play area during adjournments at their trial.32
The doli incapax defence failed to respond directly to the need for a
child to have intellectual capacity in order for criminal liability to be
imposed. It focused instead on a very subjective side-issue which was
difficult to assess: the moral awareness of the child. Jeremy Horder has
argued that it is the absence of a child’s developed moral character which
justifies the existence of a defence for children:
. . . whilst even very young children are quite capable of engaging in
intentionally harmful conduct, they do not have developed moral charac-
ters to which such conduct can be related. It is the possession of such a
character that makes possible the formation of an action upon an in-
telligent conception of the good (in) life, and hence makes it possible to
subject one’s (potential) conduct to critical moral evaluation, and shape it
in the light of that evaluation.33
Though the doli incapax defence placed the emphasis on the child’s
personal morality, perhaps a historical product of the defence’s evolu-
tion, in a modern society this looks less and less convincing as the reason
for seeking to provide a defence to a child. In the Home Office White
Paper, No More Excuses, the government stated that:
In presuming that children of this age generally do not know the difference
between naughtiness and serious wrongdoing, the notion of doli incapax is
contrary to common sense.34
Moral awareness might be symptomatic of the child’s capacity in terms
of their intellectual development, but is only one aspect of it.35 There
will be other consequences of a child’s mental immaturity which the
concept of doli incapax totally ignores. For example, Brown’s research
has demonstrated that young male drivers are more dangerous than
other drivers because of hazard perception failure rather than a different
attitude to risk.36 Because the emphasis of the doli incapax was on
morality rather than capacity, it set a very low cognitive threshold: a
31 T. Grisso et al., ‘Juveniles’ Competence to Stand Trial: A Comparison of
Adolescents and Adults’ Capacities as Trial Defendants’ (2003) 27 Law and Human
Behaviour 333; R. Abramovitch et al., ‘Young People’s Understanding and Assertion
of their Rights to Silence and Legal Counsel’ (1995) 37 Canadian Journal of
Criminology 1.
32 Mr Justice Billen, ‘Age of Criminal Responsibility: The Frontier Between Care and
Justice’ [2007] IFL 7.
33 J. Horder, ‘Pleading Involuntary Lack of Capacity’ (1993) 52(2) CLJ 298 at 301.
34 No More Excuses: A New Approach to Tackling Youth Crime in England and Wales, Cm
3809 (1997) para. 4.4.
35 See Fortin, above n. 30 at 72.
36 I. D. Brown, ‘The Traffic Offence as a Rational Decision’ in S. Lloyd-Bostock (ed.),
Psychology in Legal Contexts (Macmillan: London, 1981) 203.
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knowledge of right from wrong entails only a minimal capacity for
rational understanding.37
In reality, it is the victim’s lack of capacity in its broader sense which
justifies a refusal to impose criminal liability. Thus, the Law Commission
has written:
Some 10-year-old killers may be sufficiently advanced in their judgement
and understanding that such a conviction [for murder] would be fair.38
This reference to ‘judgement and understanding’ seems to be looking
instinctively for more than just a moral awareness which might be
incorporated in the term ‘judgement, but also an intellectual maturity
reflected in the idea of ‘understanding’.
Personal autonomy and choice
As well as a child having capacity, criminal liability, in order to be just,
must be grounded on the fact that the defendant has made a choice to
behave in the offending way.39 That choice is evidence that the person
was acting as an autonomous individual. Horder suggests that children
‘can be rationally motivated and they have feelings; they can hence
engage not merely in voluntary but in intentional conduct’,40 but such
an analysis takes a classically blinkered view of the childhood experi-
ences which continue to govern a child’s behaviour. When children are
very young, they are very much under the control and influence of their
parents. They are expected to listen to their parents’ instructions and to
obey them unquestioningly. Thus, if a parent instructs a five-year-old
child to take a toy in a shop, put it in their pocket and leave without
paying, we are comfortable with only criminalising the adult and leaving
the child untainted by the criminal law. There is, however, increasingly
strong research showing that the impact of parents on a child’s poten-
tially criminal conduct continues well beyond the age of 10 when the
current defence of being a minor disappears. The continuing influence
of adults over a child’s behaviour is reflected in the observations made
by the Court of Appeal in Wilson:41
There may be grounds for criticizing a principle of law that does not afford
a 13-year-old boy any defence to a charge of murder on the ground that he
was complying with his father’s instructions, which he was too frightened
to refuse to disobey. But our criminal law holds that a 13 year old boy is
responsible for his actions and the rule that duress provides no defence to
a charge of murder applies however susceptible the defendant may be to
the duress, absent always any question of diminished responsibility.42
37 B. C. Feld, ‘Abolish the Juvenile Court: Youthfulness, Criminal Responsibility, and
Sentencing Policy’ (1997) 88 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 68 at 98. 
38 Law Commission, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide, Law Com. Report No. 304
(2006) para. 5.130.
39 A. Ashworth, ‘Belief, Intent and Criminal Liability’ in J. Eekelaar and J. Bell (eds),
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, 3rd Series, (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 1987)
1; M. Moore, Placing Blame: Theory of Criminal Law (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997)
ch. 13.
40 Horder, above n. 33 at 302.
41 [2007] EWCA Crim 1251; [2007] 2 Cr App R 31.
42 Ibid. at [18]. 
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Peter Cane has observed that there is an ‘important focus of legal
responsibility practices which finds little or no (explicit) place in many
philosophical analyses of responsibility—namely social values . . . Policy
considerations are central to legal responsibility practices because law is
a social phenomenon, and because the principles of legal responsibility
are of general application’.43 Thus, in looking at criminal responsibility
we need to be prepared to take into account the social reality of a child’s
personal experiences, including bad parenting, poverty and violence,
rather than trying to artificially ignore these factors. These factors can
reasonably be taken into account with regard to children’s liability
because with their limited capacity they do not have a genuine oppor-
tunity to make a choice as to how they behave, the impact of these
external factors become determinative of their behaviour since children
are not autonomous individuals. This lack of autonomy is reflected in
the striking research results showing the strong correlation between
poor parenting, poverty, abuse and youth offending.44 It is only as that
correlation fades that we can genuinely consider that young people are
autonomous individuals who have made a choice to commit crime and
can be subjected to criminal responsibility.
The issue of capacity and choice in the context of children is inter-
linked. While the intellectual competence of children is under-
developed,45 the impact of the care (or absence of care) from their
parents and the social conditions in which they live are too strongly
determinative of their behaviour, including potentially criminal behavi-
our, so that they cannot be viewed as autonomous individuals with the
freedom to make a fully informed choice about the commission of a
criminal offence. Tadros has observed:
In attributing responsibility we need to consider more than the nature of
the action, we need a broader focus, both psychologically and temporally,
to investigate whether that action reflected on the agent qua agent.46
Hart has argued that the defendant’s capacities will only be sufficient to
generate responsibility if the defendant has sufficient opportunity to act
otherwise. It is true that, even for adults, the working assumption that
people act on the basis of their own free will, may be based more on a
myth than reality:47
The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a
statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very little to do with
the metaphysics of determinism or free will . . . Very simply, the law treats
43 Cane, above n. 24 at 53.
44 See, e.g., J. Graham and B. Bowling, Young People and Crime (HMSO: London,
1995) 23; D. Utting, J. Bright and C. Henricson, Crime and the Family (Family
Policy Studies Centre: London, 1996); D. J. West and D. P. Farrington, Who Becomes
Delinquent? (Heinemann: London, 1973).
45 G. Lansdown, The Evolving Capacities of the Child (UNICEF Innocenti Research
Centre: Florence, 2005) 4; Q. Spender and A. Johns, ‘Psychological and Psychiatric
Perspectives’ in J. Fionda (ed.), Legal Concepts of Childhood (Hart: Oxford, 2001) 57. 
46 V. Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Hart: Oxford, 2005) under the heading ‘Capacity,
choice and responsibility’.
47 T. O’Connor, ‘Free Will’ in E. N. Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Stanford University Centre for the Study of Language and Information: Stanford,
2002).
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man’s conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it
is desirable to proceed as if it were.48
While the determinists have highlighted problems with these concepts
in everyday life which the law chooses to ignore, the absence of these
qualities of personal autonomy and individual choice become too acute
in the context of children to be justly ignored: the gap between the
theory and the reality becomes too pronounced in the context of
children.
A young person is not actually allowed in law to make many funda-
mental choices for themselves, for example, until the courts determine
that the child is Gillick49 competent the parents are legally entitled to step
in and make decisions regarding the medical treatment of the child. In
considering the setting of minimum ages of criminal responsibility, the
Beijing Rules adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1985
observe:
In general, there is a close relationship between the notion of responsibility
for delinquent or criminal behaviour and other social rights and respons-
ibilities (such as marital status, civil majority, etc).50
These social rights reflect the acquired autonomy of children as emerg-
ing adults and their ability to make choices for themselves.
The influences on a child are multiple, it is not just his or her family
(or absence of an effective family) that will be influencing a child’s
behaviour, but also increasingly, for example, the electronic media in
the form of computer games, the internet, the television and so forth. In
this media children ‘are fed unrealistic fantasies of power, and action is
portrayed which remains without social consequences’.51 Children’s
moral competency develops dynamically over time through their rela-
tionships with the people around them.52 If those relationships are
unsatisfactory, then this will directly impact on their personal develop-
ment. Steps in social learning and the formation of conscience and
responsibility require intense care and personal warmth with the
child.53 Defects in parental care may restrict the child’s cognitive devel-
opment.54 In addition the physical environment in which a child grows
influences the way in which he or she perceives the wrongfulness of
behaviour. For example, if children grow up in an area where there is a
lot of visible crime, they may take this to be the social norm.55 Graham
48 H. L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press: Stanford,
1968) 74–5.
49 Gillick v West Norfolk and Wisbech Area Health Authority [1984] QB 581.
50 United Nations General Assembly, above n. 29 at commentary to para. 4.1.
51 D. Frehsee, ‘Strafreife—Reife dess Jugendlichen oder Reife der Gesellschaft’  in
P Albrecht, (3d) Festschrift FurSchuler-Springorum zum 65 390. Geburstag (1993),
quoted by T. Crofts, The Criminal Responsibility of Children and Young Persons
(Ashgate: Aldershot, 2002) 191.
52 J. Fagan, ‘Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime’ (1999) Virginia Journal of
Social Policy and the Law 507.
53 M. Walter, Jugendkriminalitat (Borberg: Stuttgart, 1995) 59 quoted by Crofts, above
n. 51.
54 Ibid. at 60.
55 H. Angenent and A. de Man, Background Factors of Juvenile Delinquency (Lang: New
York, 1996) 179.
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and Bowling’s research has identified the strong correlation between
parental behaviour and youth crime.56 West and Farrington have shown
that factors such as parental criminality or social deviance, conflict-
ridden or broken homes, lack of early care and supervision and living in
a delinquent neighbourhood were all predictive of delinquent behav-
iour, while ‘good homes’ were a protective factor against offending.57
Where children commit murder, their home backgrounds are charac-
terised by paternal psychopathy, alcohol abuse, violent fathers, absence
from the home, a depressed mother and histories of serious sexual and
physical abuse.58 Kazdin has noted that delinquent children had had
greater exposure to a variety of traumas, such as child abuse and
domestic violence compared to non-delinquent samples.59 Petit et al.
have developed a model to explain how early experiences such as abuse
or insecure attachments can ultimately lead to aggressive behaviour.60
The majority of children who come into contact with the criminal
justice system are characterised by poverty.61 Crowley’s study of per-
sistent child offenders found that:
experience of poverty, deprivation, abuse and neglect were . . . common-
place, as were family disruption and violence.62
Two separate studies have shown that social and environmental influ-
ences can even in extremely rare cases, lead young people to kill.63
The fact that a person is born into a dysfunctional family and an
unsatisfactory social environment is an example of bad luck over which
that person has no control. The criminal law has to decide how sensitive
to be where luck or bad luck have played a part in determining an
individual’s criminal conduct. Rawls has argued that while luck should
be ignored when distributing resources, it is relevant to the allocation of
responsibility.64 Although traditionally the criminal law chooses actively
56 Graham and Bowling, above n. 44 at 23; see also Utting, Bright and Henricson,
above n. 44.
57 West and Farrington, above n. 44.
58 S. Bailey, ‘Adolescents who Murder—A Critical Comment on Key Provisions
relating to Children in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998’ (1996) 19 Journal of
Adolescence 19. See also G. Boswell, Young and Dangerous—the Background and
Careers of Section 53 Offenders (Avebury: Aldershot, 1996); D. M. Fergusson,
J. L. Horwood and M. T. Lynskey, The Childhoods of Multiple Problem Adolescents: A
15 Year Longitudinal Study (Christchurch Child Health and Development Study,
1992).
59 A. E. Kazdin, ‘Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders and Decision Making of
Delinquent Youths’ in T. Grisso and R. Schwartz (eds), Youth on Trial: A
Developmental Perspective on Juvenile Justice (University of Chicago Press: Chicago,
2000) 49.
60 G. Pettit, J. Polaha and J. Mize, ‘Perceptual and Attributional Processes in
Aggression and Conduct Problems’ in J. Hill and B. Maughan (eds), Conduct
Disorders in Childhood and Adolescence (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge,
2001) 304.
61 D. P. Farrington, ‘Human Development and Criminal Careers’ in M. Maguire,
R. Morgan and R. Reiner (eds), Oxford Handbook of Criminology (Oxford University
Press: Oxford, 2002).
62 A. Crowley, A Criminal Waste: A Study of Child Offenders Eligible for Secure Training
Orders (The Children’s Society: London, 1998) quoted by L. Gelsthorpe, ‘Much
Ado about Nothing’ (1999) 11 CFLQ 209 at footnote 64.
63 Bailey, above n. 58; Boswell, above n. 58.
64 J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1972) 310.
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to ignore circumstances which explain the context for a given act,65 to
do so with regard to the conduct of young children risks ignoring the
very essence of what has occurred and as a result is unjust and unjustifi-
able. The research has shown such a close co-relation between negative
elements of the external environment in which a child is living and
criminal conduct that it is clear that it is these external factors that have
been determinative of the child’s criminal conduct rather than the child
acting as an autonomous individual exercising a choice. Perhaps focus-
ing on issues of morality and ignoring personal responsibility was his-
torically understandable, but as social research techniques have become
more advanced and the resulting statistical evidence has become clearer
regarding the impact of such issues as poor parenting and poverty on a
child’s criminal behaviour, it is now blatantly unjust to simply ignore the
social reality.
Legal recognition of the parental input into the criminal conduct of a
child is reflected in the growth of legislation which sanctions parents for
their children’s illegal acts.66 For example, s. 8 of the Crime and Disorder
Act 1998 allows the courts to impose a parenting order requiring a
parent to attend counselling or guidance sessions on how to bring up
their children. They may also be required to exercise control over their
child. But this development has not been accompanied by an equivalent
reduction of the criminal liability of the child.
A reduction in the minimum age of responsibility would reflect the
fact that as children grow up into autonomous adults they actually
frequently choose to stop breaking the criminal law—children naturally
grow out of crime.67 Most adolescent offending is carried out by youths
in mid to late adolescence who do not proceed to a career in crime.68
Therefore a child’s lack of intellectual competence, autonomy and free
will is a temporary state which the children will normally grow through
and their behaviour will naturally cease to be problematic. The fact that
children grow out of crime is seen by Horder as a fundamental justifica-
tion for allowing children a defence:
A less demanding standard of self-control ought to be expected of a young
defendant (depending, obviously, on his or her exact age), with the result
that disproportionate (murderous) attacks by provoked young persons, in
response to an objectively trivial provocation may none the less sometimes
be excused. ‘Why? For the simple reason that the less well-developed
powers of self-control of young persons are a reflection of their naturally as
yet incompletely-realised potential to become fully accountable moral
agents.  Their less well-developed powers of self-control can hence be a
65 J. Armour, ‘Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice and Blame’ (1996) 57
University of Pittsburgh Law Review 525.
66 E. Brank, S. Kucera and S. Hays, ‘Parental Responsibility Statutes: An
Organisation and Policy Implications’ (2005) 7 Journal of Law and Family Studies 1.
67 A. Rutherford, Growing Out of Crime: The New Era (Waterside Press: Winchester,
1992) 11.
68 E. Mulvey and M. Aber, ‘Growing Out of Delinquency: Development and
Desistance’ in R. L. Jenkins and W. Brown (eds), The Abandonment of Delinquent
Behaviour: Promoting the Turnaround (Praeger: New York, 1988); T. E. Moffitt
‘Adolescence—Limited And Life-Course-Persistent Anti-Social Behaviour: A
Developmental Taxonomy’ (1993) 100 Psychological Review 674.
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reflection of their mental normality and are thus appropriately catered for
by special treatment, within the confines of a doctrine designed for those
who are, in Ashworth’s phrase ‘in a broad sense, mentally normal’.69
A New Defence for Children Aged Between 10 and 14
Once the rationale for allowing a defence for children is clearly under-
stood it becomes obvious that the doli incapax defence did need to be
abolished because it continued to place the emphasis on children’s
personal responsibility for their conduct and failed to acknowledge their
lack of autonomy whether or not they had an advanced moral under-
standing of their conduct. Even so, the doli incapax defence needed to be
replaced by a new defence which was not discretionary on the child’s
personal moral development, but which focused on the child’s capacity
and ability to choose. While these may seem very loose theoretical
concepts on which to base a legal defence, they have already been placed
at the heart of the offence of rape and the potential availability of a
defence of consent, through the statutory definition of consent which
makes explicit reference to capacity, freedom and choice.70
At a certain point the child must make the transition from an indi-
vidual who is within the control and remit of his or her carers and an
autonomous individual responsible for his or her own conduct. This
transition takes place progressively and depends on their personal cir-
cumstances and their personal development. However, in law, con-
sistency and clear rules are important, which could not be provided by
the flexible doli incapax rule. It is impossible to identify fixed ages at
which children reach certain levels of development. Attempts have been
made to identify the stages through which children develop,71 but these
have subsequently been criticised as over-simplistic and not taking into
account adequately the individual differences in the way children de-
velop.72 It is undesireable to have a flexible age limit as was provided for
by the defence of doli incapax, because the concepts that ground the
defence are almost impossible to measure accurately: social background
and intellectual competence. The doli incapax defence was ultimately
socio-culturally dependent, relying on concepts which were neither
measurable nor predictable. The resulting risk that judges might exercise
their discretion in a discriminatory way was highlighted by the United
Nations Human Rights Committee.73
Thus a fixed year needs to be chosen which will be applied to all
children. One thing we can safely say is that this level of autonomy does
69 J. Horder, ‘Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility’ (1999) King’s
College Law Journal 143 at 144.
70 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 74.
71 L. Kohlberg, ‘Development of Moral Character and Moral Ideology’ in M. Hoffman
and L. Hoffman (eds), Review of Child Development Research, vol. 1 (Russell Sage
Foundation: New York, 1964); J. Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (Harcourt:
New York, 1932); E. Erikson, Childhood and Society (Penguin: Harmondsworth,
1950) 239.
72 Rutter and Rutter, above n. 30 at 1. 
73 The Committee viewed the defence of doli incapax in Sri Lanka as a matter of
profound concern: CCPR/ C/79/Add.56, 27 July 1995.
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not develop at the age of 10: in UK society 10-year-old children are very
much under the influence of the adults and peers around them. The
logical point at which it would make sense to put this age limit would be
16 when the child is civilly recognised as developing his or her personal
autonomy by having the right to leave school and to get married. In
reality, it would probably be easier politically to set the minimum age
limit at 14 with a view to raising it to 16 at a future date, as society’s
attitudes to children and misbehaviour adapt. The different rationale for
the status defence (under 10) and the ‘lack of autonomy’ defence (10 to
14) could be reflected in the legislation so that they could be applied as
two separate defences rather than being legislated as one single unitary
defence.
In its Consultation Paper, Tackling Youth Crime,74 the government
suggested that justice would be better served if the courts took account
of the child’s age and maturity at the stage of sentencing rather than
through a mechanism which hindered prosecution,75 but this ignores
the fact that it is fundamentally unjust and inappropriate to hold person-
ally to account young people who are not autonomous individuals
benefiting from a freedom of choice.
At the moment the only recourse that young offenders aged over
nine years old can have to avoid the full weight of the criminal law is to
argue that they are  unfit to plead,76 but this carries the risk of a hospital
order or confinement in a secure unit. It is a procedural argument which
focuses on the defendant’s capacities at the time of the trial, rather than
looking at his or her capacity at the time of the offending behaviour and
the reasons for the criminal conduct in the first place. Because youth is
not static, it is possible that a young person’s understanding may well
have advanced from the time of the offending behaviour, but more
importantly a defence that the young person is unfit to plead does not fill
the gap left by the absence of a defence of being a minor lacking
autonomy and freedom of choice. While capacity to understand the trial
proceedings and give evidence are important requirements and this
procedural defence should continue to exist, one can easily imagine a
child who has this capacity, but at the time of the offence was still not
acting as an autonomous individual who chose to act in the relevant
way.
The Law Commission’s recommendations on reforming the homicide
offences reflect anxieties that the current law is unduly harsh on young
offenders, but it proposed only a partial defence to the most serious
offence of murder and its availability would be focused on ‘devel-
opmental immaturity’ which would be drawn within the defence of
diminished responsibility.77 The Law Commission has explained that
this defence would be available if defendants could prove that the
74 Home Office, above n. 17.
75 Ibid. at para. 13.
76 CPS v P [2007] EWHC 946 (Admin).
77 Law Commission, above n. 38 at paras 5.125–5.137.
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defendant’s capacity for judgement, control or understanding was sub-
stantially impaired by developmental immaturity.78 Various objections
can be made to this proposal. It provides no solace to young people who
misbehave with less serious consequences. It ties youth with a defence
which is generally associated with mental ill health. It suggests that
young people who benefit from this defence are abnormal in their
‘developmental immaturity’ whereas actually they are typical of young
children; it is the consequences of their action which is abnormal. The
criteria of maturity or immaturity is as subjective as moral awareness
and therefore avoids none of the problems associated with doli incapax.
Ultimately, the Law Commission needs to go back to the roots of why
children should be treated differently from adults; it is allowing this
defence by purely focusing on one justification for not criminalising
children—their lack of intellectual capacity—while unreasonably ignor-
ing the second—their lack of individual autonomy and free will. Chil-
dren are not fully independent of their adult carers and the availability
of a defence for children should acknowledge this. Interestingly, when
looking for developmental immaturity the Law Commission suggests
that the court could take into account ‘social and environmental influ-
ences’,79 but the primary focus is still too narrow, ignoring the issue of
autonomy and free will. A search for ‘developmental immaturity’ or
‘moral awareness’ for doli incapax is a red herring which distracts the
courts from the crucial issue that the child defendant not only lacked
capacity, but also lacked autonomy at the time of the offending behavi-
our to justify criminal liability.
Civil justice over criminal justice
Arguments have been made that criminal responsibility can be imposed
on children because the youth justice system is geared more towards
education and reform rather than punishment.80 Glanville Williams
wrote back in 1954 that:
at the present day the ‘knowledge of wrong’ test stands in the way not of
punishment, but of educational treatment.  It saves the child not from
prison, transportation or the gallows, but from the probation officer, the
foster-parent, or the approved school.81
While such arguments may be well meaning, they are ultimately mis-
leading.82 The UK has a child welfare system which can caters for
children without them being criminalised beforehand. In practice, the
youth justice system clearly does punish children including detaining
them away from their parents against their will, even if basic opportun-
ities for education and reform are offered at the same time. Following
the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 children aged 10 can be
78 Ibid. at para. 5.131.
79 Ibid. at para. 5.132.
80 G. Williams, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Children’ [1954] Crim LR 493.
81 Ibid. at 496.
82 G. Van Bueren, ‘Child-Oriented Justice—An International Challenge for Europe’
(1992) 6 International Journal of Law and the Family 381 at 381–2; P. Cavadino
‘Goodbye doli, must we leave you?’ (1997) 9 CFLQ 165.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
Criminal Responsibility and Children
303
given long-term sentences of detention for serious offences. The United
Nations’ Committee on the Rights of the Child criticised the UK for ‘high
and increasing numbers of children being held in custody at earlier ages
for lesser offences and for longer custodial sentences’.83 In January 2007
2,364 children under 18 were being held in youth offender institutions84
which only have very limited facilities for education and rehabilitation.
While the Youth Justice Board set a target of 30 hours per week of
education and training for young people being held in custody, no
juvenile establishment has succeeded in meeting this target.85 Thus at
the moment children in custody do not have the same access to educa-
tion and special needs provision which are enjoyed by children outside
custody.
Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights has stated that the
level of physical assault and the degree of physical restraint experienced
by children in detention represents an unacceptable contravention of
the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.86 The Joint
Committee recommended that:
. . . the Government revisit the idea of completely separating the organisa-
tion responsible for the custody of offenders under the age of 18 from the
Prison Service. These young people should be looked after by a group of
people whose outlook is firmly grounded in a culture of respect of child-
ren’s human rights, devoted to rehabilitation and care.87
Field’s research into police handling of young offenders shows why the
criminal justice system is the wrong place for young offenders.88 The
police are inevitably focused on the offence that has been committed
and, in their decision-making, push aside issues about the child’s back-
ground considering them to be a distraction:
[C]ustody sergeants tended to exclude most offender-based issues from
their account of their own decision-making. Matters of family background,
whether it be evidence of parental support or neglect, were said not to be
relevant.89
The tensions that can arise in a criminal justice system which is
theoretically aiming to protect the welfare of the child was recognised
back in 1960 by the Ingleby Committee. Efforts to educate and deal with
the welfare problems of the child will not succeed in a criminal justice
system which has been built on the foundations of punishment. The
penal system does not ensure that the welfare needs of child defendants
83 Concluding Observations of the UN Committee on the Rights of the Child: United
Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland (2002) 15, para. 57.
84 UK Government, The Consolidated 3rd and 4th Periodic Report to UN Committee on the
Rights of the Child (Department for Children, Schools and Families: Nottingham,
2002) para. 8.76.
85 European Committee of Social Rights, above n. 14.
86 House of Lords/House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, UN
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 10th Report of Session 2002/03, para. 12,
available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/jtselect/jtrights/117/
11704.htm, accessed 7 June 2011. 
87 Ibid. at para. 65.
88 S. Field, ‘Early Intervention and the “New” Youth Justice: A Study of Initial
Decision-making’ [2008] Crim LR 177.
89 Ibid. at 185.
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are noted, assessed and actually met. For example, consistent systems
are not in place to make sure that all child defendants undergo a welfare
assessment. Children are remanded into secure accommodation for
months before their trial, where little attention is given to welfare and
treatment issues, as this is not the role of secure accommodation ser-
vices.90 There is frequently a total lack of medium- to long-term care
planning by local authorities in relation to children who are caught up as
defendants in criminal proceedings:
It may be assumed that, since children placed on remand in secure accom-
modation are being cared for, they are also ‘in care’, even in the absence of
a care order. The issue of who is parenting such child defendants and who
has parental responsibility for the child is often lost in the anxiety to protect
the evidence. This means that professionals may become paralysed in their
thinking about the welfare considerations and may state that no care plan
can be considered until the trial is over. Confusion exists about the preced-
ence that should be taken by the criminal justice system requirements over
any welfare considerations such as therapy for the child or contact with
relatives, when it is feared that such processes could contaminate evidence
in the trial.91
In 1960, the Ingleby Committee observed:
It is not easy to see how the two principles can be reconciled: criminal
responsibility is focused on an allegation about some particular act isolated
from the character and needs of the defendant, whereas welfare depends
on a complex of personal, family and social considerations.92
The way forward is to develop fully the civil solutions to support young
people. The recognition of a child’s lack of criminal responsibility due to
his or her lack of capacity and freedom of choice also points the civil
courts in the right direction in how to deal with these children. All
efforts need to be focused on why these children behaved in the manner
concerned and those causes must be tackled, which will inevitably
include the possibility of taking the child into care where the parenting
is clearly failing with dangerous consequences. The funding for the civil
system could be greatly enhanced by removing the funding currently
poured into the youth justice system.
In 2007, Smith LJ93 recognised that in some cases civil proceedings
under the Children Act 1989 would be more appropriate than criminal
proceedings. In DPP v R,94 Hughes LJ commented in the High Court
that:
. . . where very young, or very handicapped, children are concerned there
may often be better ways of dealing with inappropriate behaviour than the
full panoply of a criminal trial. Even where the complaint is of sexual
behaviour it ought not to be thought that it is invariably in the public
interest for it to be investigated by means of a criminal trial, rather than by
90 Royal College of Psychiatrists, above n. 28 at 57.
91 Ibid. at 9.
92 Report of the Committee on Children and Young Persons (Ingleby Committee), Cm 1191
(1960) para. 60.
93 R v W [2007] EWCA Crim 1251, [2007] 2 Cr App R 31 at [33], [35] and [51].
94 [2007] EWHC 1842 (Admin).
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inter-disciplinary action and co-operation between those who are experi-
enced in dealing with children of this age and handicap.95
Criminal proceedings should not be the gateway to educational and
social services,96 these should be completely separate from criminal
proceedings because they have very different roles in our society. The
priority of the criminal justice system is, by definition, punishment and
annexing educational and social services does not remove the fact that a
child has been stigmatised with a criminal conviction and punished for
that behaviour.
That is not to say that children should not receive punishment for
their misbehaviour—children are often punished without recourse to
the criminal courts and this will continue to be the case, but the
punishment will be proportionate to the personal responsibility of the
child which will inevitably be restricted because of his or her limited
capacity and personal autonomy. Instead the genuine emphasis of the
civil system will be on education and welfare without the distractions of
punishment which take priority in a criminal justice system. But experi-
ence both in the UK and abroad suggests that we must be careful in any
transition from criminal proceedings to civil proceedings to avoid chil-
dren having the disadvantages of a civil solution (the burden of proof
only being on the balance of probabilities and the more lenient pro-
cedural approach) combined with the disadvantages of a punishment in
the guise of a supposedly educational or welfare solution. Don Cipriani
has commented that administrative proceedings ‘too frequently result in
the imposition of forms of deprivation of liberty in the guise of educa-
tional or protective measures, often for lengthy periods that may be
neither pre-determined nor properly monitored and reviewed’.97
By going down the route of criminal responsibility, society is placing
the blame for the wrongdoing firmly at the feet of the child, whereas the
evidence suggests that the causes of such wrongdoing are actually
the product of the child’s social environment. Once this is accepted, the
justification for criminal responsibility fades away leaving the uncom-
fortable reality that we can no longer neatly blame one individual for the
wrongdoing that has occurred, but we have to accept a shared respons-
ibility for it. The remedy is not to seek to punish that one individual
child, but to look at the social environment in which he or she has been
placed and see what changes need to be made to avoid future wrong-
doing. When the wrong done is as serious as the murder of a child, such
as James Bulger, this is a particularly painful lesson to accept, but the
inclination to turn into a lynch mob against the children who were the
direct perpetrators of the wrongful conduct must be avoided in a civil-
ised society.
What the law has done is to choose from among the characteristics of
certain children, not their lack of a decent education (through no fault of
95 [2007] EWHC 1842 (Admin) at [37].
96 For an alternative view, see G Williams, ‘The Criminal Responsibility of Children’
[1954] Crim LR 493.
97 Cipriani, above n. 13 at x.
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their own,) or their location in dilapidated slum housing (through no fault
of their own), or their unattended to health problems (through no fault of
their own), etc., but the instance of conduct in which they violated the
penal law. So long as the legal system thus isolates and highlights that
aspect of the child which rationally calls for the least sympathy, and ignores
the conditions of his life that would evoke a desire to help, the law simply
serves to reinforce the severity of public attitudes.98
This is not to say that a child who commits a serious wrong is morally
blameless, but it accepts that civil law procedures can tackle more
effectively children whose behaviour is symptomatic of the social
environment in which they have found themselves. Whenever children
are naughty they need to be punished in order for them to learn
appropriate behaviour, but the punishment must be proportionate to
the level of personal wrongdoing of the child. Because the criminal law
places all of the blame on the individual offender and ignores the social
context in which the offending has taken place, the resulting punish-
ment can be out of all proportion to the actual individual wrongdoing.
The criminal law is not the only setting in which a child can be
punished—a child may be scolded by means of a severe telling-off by his
parents, sent to his bedroom or banned from playing on his computer for
a number of hours or days. There is no need for the criminal system to
be involved, simply because a level of punishment is required, but by
enrolling the criminal law in the process, the stage is set for a dispropor-
tionate punishment to be imposed.99
Once it is accepted that there is a collective responsibility for the
wrongdoing, then society can accept the additional financial and per-
sonal resources that need to be invested through the civil welfare system
in order to tackle such behaviour. Children can be forced to confront the
moral blameworthiness of their conduct without dragging them
through a criminal justice system that was designed for adults.
When a child commits a serious harm there might be an under-
standable desire to punish that child through the criminal justice system,
but the evidence is that this will prove counter-productive.100 The most
effective delinquency prevention and early intervention programs for
young children are non-punitive and home and school-based, focusing
on the parents and other family members.101 These programmes are
delivered by the mental health and child welfare services rather than the
98 S. Fox, ‘Responsibility in the Juvenile Court’ (1969–70) 11 William and Mary Law
Review 659 at 674.
99 Gelsthorpe, above n. 62.
100 T. Thornberry, D. Huizinga and R. Loeberet, ‘The Causes and Correlates Studies:
Finding and Policy Implications’ (2004) 9 Juvenile Justice 3; D. Farrington, ‘Early
Identification and Preventive Intervention: How Effective Is This Strategy?’ (2005)
4 Criminology and Public Policy 237; US Government Accountability Office,
Residential Treatment Programs, Concerns Regarding Abuse and Death in Certain
Programs for Troubled Youth (US Department of Justice: Washington, 2007);
R. Loeber, D. Farrington and D. Petechuk, Child Delinquency: Early Intervention and
Prevention, Child Delinquency Bulletin Series (US Department of Justice, Office of
Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention: Washington, 2003).
101 B. Burns et al., Treatment Services and Intervention Programs for Child Delinquents, (US
Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention:
Washington, 2003).
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criminal justice system.102 The Youth Inclusion Programme would seem
to be a model of the way forward in tackling youth crime: prevention
rather than a punitive reaction. This programme was established in 2000
and targets children aged between 8 and 16 who are considered to be at
high risk of involvement in offending or anti-social behaviour. It pro-
vides children with somewhere safe to learn new skills, take part in
activities, get help with education and receive career guidance. An
independent national evaluation of the programme in its first three
years found that of the 50 children most at risk of committing crime in
each of the schemes set up, the arrest rate had been reduced by 65 per
cent.103
Conclusion
The current law ignores the social reality that a range of ‘bad luck’ social
factors frequently lead a child of under-developed intellectual capacity
to misbehave. The imposition of criminal responsibility is the gateway to
punishment, and only those people for whom individual punishment
can be justified should be subjected to this level of responsibility. An
exploration of the concept of criminal responsibility has highlighted that
it cannot be justified where children lack capacity and freedom of choice
in their behaviour. This analysis challenges the use of the criminal
justice process in dealing with youth offending. Unfortunately, at the
moment, children are increasingly being criminalised, particularly fol-
lowing the abolition of the defence of doli incapax. Admittedly, this old
defence placed an unsatisfactory emphasis on a child’s moral awareness,
but the remaining status defence of being a minor is only available to
children aged under 10. This article therefore proposes that a new
defence should be established for minors aged between 10 and 14 which
would bring to the fore a key rationale for the defence—that the child
lacked autonomy because of his or her lack of capacity and choice. These
issues would then be central to how the child is to be dealt with by the
civil justice system.104
102 P. Greenwood, Changing Lives: Delinquency Prevention as Crime Control Policy
(University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 2005).
103 UK Government, above n. 84 at para. 8.109.
104 R. Allen, From Punishment to Problem-Solving: A New Approach to Children in Trouble
(Centre for Crime and Justice Studies: London, 2006). See also Commission on
Families and the Well-being of Children, Families and the State: An Inquiry into the
Relationship between the State and the Family (Family and Parenting Institute:
London, 2005).
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